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Abstract. When outsourcing the storage of sensitive data to an (un-
trusted) remote server, a data owner may choose to encrypt the data
beforehand to preserve confidentiality. However, it is then difficult to
efficiently retrieve specific portions of the data as the server is unable
to identify the relevant information. Searchable encryption has been well
studied as a solution to this problem, allowing data owners and other au-
thorised users to generate search queries which the server may execute
over the encrypted data to identify relevant data portions.
However, many current schemes lack two important properties: verifia-
bility of search results, and expressive queries. We introduce Extended
Verifiable Searchable Encryption (eVSE) that permits a user to verify
that search results are correct and complete. We also permit verifiable
computational queries over keywords and specific data values, that go be-
yond the standard keyword matching queries to allow functions such as
averaging or counting operations. We formally define the notion of eVSE
within relevant security models and give a provably secure instantiation.
1 Introduction
It is now common for data owners to outsource their data to public servers
providing storage on a pay-as-you-go basis. This can reduce the costs of data
storage compared with that of running a private data center (e.g. hardware,
construction, air conditioning and security costs), making this a cost effective
solution. If the server is not fully trusted and the data is of a sensitive nature,
the data owner may wish to encrypt it to ensure confidentiality. This, however,
prevents the efficient retrieval of specific portions of the data as the server is
unable to identify the relevant information.
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Searchable Encryption (SE) [11, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 32] addresses this issue
by indexing the encrypted data in such a way as to allow a server to execute
a search query (formed by the data owner or an authorised data user) over the
encrypted data and return the identifiers of any file that satisfies the query.
To preserve confidentiality of the data, the server must not learn anything
about the underlying data from the encrypted data and the data indexes; namely
ciphertext indistinguishability and index indistinguishability. In the presence of
a search query the only information leaked to the server is the search results.
Query indistinguishability is also a desirable property although, due to the oﬄine
keyword guessing attack [12], this is not always easy to achieve in the public key
setting (where indexes are generated using the data owner’s public key).
The majority of existing work on SE focusses on efficiently preserving confi-
dentiality in the presence of an honest-but-curious server. This means that the
server is trusted to follow the search protocol honestly but may try to infer
information about data or search queries that it is unauthorised to know.
Verifiable Searchable Encryption (VSE) [13, 24, 30, 35, 37] assumes a stronger
semi-honest-but-curious adversarial model in which the server might execute
only a fraction of the search, or return a fraction of the search results in order
to preserve its resources. To ensure the completeness and correctness of search
results in this scenario, it is required that the server is able to prove to the
querier that the search was computed honestly.
The current approaches to VSE in the literature do not support a wide range
of expressive search queries. We address this issue by extending the types of
queries that can be executed and verified by a VSE scheme to include more
expressive search queries, as well as some computations. Most VSE schemes in
the literature also require that the verification of query results be performed by
the entity that issued the query whereas eVSE is publicly and blindly verifiable.
1.1 Our Contributions
We adapt and apply new techniques from the area of Publicly Verifiable Out-
sourced Computation to VSE in a novel way to enable a wider family of queries,
and some types of computations, to be performed over outsourced encrypted
data with verifiable query results. In summary, our contributions are:
– More expressive queries: Our scheme supports queries such as boolean formu-
lae involving conjunctions, disjunctions and negations, threshold operations,
polynomials, arbitrary CNF and DNF formulae, and fuzzy search1.
– Evaluation of computations: Our scheme supports the evaluation of some
computations over the encrypted data, such as averaging and counting oper-
ations. As well as assigning keywords to label data, we propose to also assign
keywords representing certain data values that may be computed over (either
in the form of single keywords or as a string of keywords encoding binary
data, see Section 3.3).
1 Depending on the choice of underlying ABE scheme; see Section 4.1.
– Blind public verifiability of query results: Any entity is able to verify the cor-
rectness and completeness of query results without any knowledge of either
the underlying query or the results themselves.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some
background information on SE and verifiable computation. Section 3 formally
defines eVSE and its security model, Section 4 gives an instantiation of eVSE and
Section 5 concludes the paper, highlighting possible avenues of future research.
The Appendix provides more details on the security models and gives a security
proof sketch as well as a discussion comparing our scheme with the ones in the
literature. Additional details can be found in the full version [3].
2 Background
Searchable encryption (SE) allows data to be outsourced in encrypted form
and for keyword search queries to be performed remotely. Methods based on
oblivious RAM [19] provide a high level of security (hiding both the access and
search patterns) at the expense of slow search times and high communication
costs. Song et al. [28] achieve a scheme with fewer rounds of communication, but
which leaks the access pattern and requires each word of a document to be en-
crypted separately, so compression is not possible. Goh [18] introduced meta data
(indexes) describing the content of each document, and enabled constant time
searches using Bloom filters over the index only. Curtmola et al. [15] extended
the system model to allow multiple users to query the data, using broadcast
encryption to manage user access privileges. SE schemes that allow many users
to upload data can be built using public key encryption, however the data can
only be searched by the holder of the corresponding secret key (or a derivative
thereof) [11]. Most SE schemes assume an honest-but-curious server model.
Verifiable searchable encryption (VSE) schemes assume a semi-honest-
but-curious server model. The first VSE scheme was presented by Chai et al.
[13], where they extend the paradigm of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE)
[15] to create a verifiable SSE (VSSE) scheme that allows verification of search
results from a single keyword equality query. Another approach by [24] extends a
public key encryption with keyword search scheme [11] to support verification of
search results from a single keyword equality query, where the indexes are created
using a public key. Sun et al. [30] and Wang et al. [34] detail VSE schemes with
enhanced functionality; verifiable multi-keyword ranked search and verifiable
fuzzy keyword search, respectively.
Verifiable Computation (VC) allows a client with limited resources to ef-
ficiently outsource a computation to a more powerful server, and to verify the
correctness of results. Gennaro et al. [17] considered the use of garbled circuits,
whilst Parno et al. [26] introduced publicly verifiable computation (PVC) built
from key policy attribute based enryption (KP-ABE), where a single client com-
putes an evaluation key for the server and publishes information enabling other
clients to outsource computation to the server. Any client may verify the correct-
ness of a result. Alderman et al. [2] considered an alternative system model that
used ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) to allow clients to
query computations on data held by the server (or initially outsourced by a
client) called Verifiable Delegable Computation (VDC). This can naturally be
applied to problems like querying on remote data, as well as MapReduce. Data
remains statically stored on the server and may be embedded in a server’s secret
key, whilst the computation of many different functions can be requested by
creating ciphertexts using only public information. Other notable approaches in
the realm of querying remote data can be found in [4–6, 8–10, 14].
3 Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption
3.1 System Model
We consider a system comprising a data owner, a remote storage server, and a set
of authorised data users. The data owner sets up the system to generate a master
secret and holds a set of data D (e.g. a database) that they wish to encrypt
and outsource to the remote server. The data owner controls which additional
users are able to query their encrypted data. Queries may be formulated over
these keywords (e.g. to identify records associated with a given set of keywords)
as usual in SE, but we also allow computational queries of functions in the
class NC1, which consists of Boolean functions computable by circuits of depth
O(log n) where each gate has a fan-in of two, over encoded data values.
For example consider workgroups within an organisation. The manager or
system administrator acts as the data owner for the organisation and outsources
a shared database to a remote server. Authorisation is granted by issuing a
secret key to each user, which is required when creating a query token QTQ for
a particular query Q. The token is sent to the server who performs the query
on the encoded index to generate a result R. We allow any entity to verify the
correctness and completeness of the result2, but we restrict the ability to read
the value of the result to only authorised data users (holding a retrieval key).
Throughout this work, we assume a strict separation between queriers (the
data owner and users) and the remote server – the server may not issue queries
itself, else it will trivially be able to learn the encoding of the index and queries
(legitimate queriers must know this encoding to gain meaningful results).
3.2 Formal Definition
We now formally define a scheme for eVSE. We use the following notation.
Data to be outsourced is denoted D and is considered to be a collection of
n documents. Prior to outsourcing, the data owner specifies a pre-index for
D, denoted δ(D), which assigns a set of descriptive labels to each document
e.g. keywords contained in the document or specific data values that may be
computed upon. The encoded form of the data, including the descriptive labels,
2 We also permit the server to verify correctness to avoid the rejection problem, where
a server may learn some useful information by observing if results are accepted.
is referred to as the index of D, denoted ID, and is stored by the server. Queries
for functions in the class NC1 are denoted by Q and to make such a query, a
data user creates a query token QTQ for Q, a verification key V KQ which allows
any entity to blindly verify the result, R, of the query, and a retrieval key RKQ
which is issued to authorised data users to enable the query result to be learnt.
Definition 1. An Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption (eVSE) scheme
comprises the following algorithms:
– (MK,PP)
$← Setup(1κ,U) : Run by the data owner and takes as input the
security parameter and a universe of attributes (keywords and data values).
It outputs the data owner’s master secret key MK that is used for further
administrative tasks and public parameters PP, both of which are provided
to the remaining algorithms where required.
– (ID, sts, sto) $← BuildIndex(δ(D), G,MK,PP) : Run by the data owner and
takes as input the pre-index of the data δ(D) and the set G of authorised
users, and outputs a searchable index ID for the data D, as well as a server
and data owner state.
– (SKID, sts)
$← AddUser(ID, G,MK,PP) : Run by the data owner to authorise
a user ID to perform queries by issuing them a secret key SKID and outputs
an updated server state.
– (QTQ, V KQ, RKQ)
$← Query(Q, sts, sto, SKID,PP) : Run by a data user
using its secret key and both states to generate a query token QTQ for a
query Q, a verification key V KQ and an output retrieval key RKQ.
– R
$← Search(ID, QTQ, sts, SKS,PP) : Run by the server to execute a query
given in the query token QTQ on the index ID. It generates a result R which
can be returned to the querying user or published.
– r ← Verify(R, V KQ, RTQ, RKQ,PP) : Verification consists of two steps:
1. RTQ ← BVerif(R, V KQ,PP) : Run by any party to verify the correctness
and completeness of the result R. It takes the verification key V KQ and,
if the result is accepted, it outputs a retrieval token RTQ which can
be used to learn the result. Otherwise a distinguished failure symbol
RTQ =⊥ is returned.
2. r ← Retrieve(V KQ, RTQ, RKQ,PP) : Run by a data user to read the
value of the result. It takes as input the retrieval token RTQ, the retrieval
key RKQ and the user’s secret key. If the user holds a valid retrieval key
for Q and the computation was performed correctly, then it returns the
actual result r = Q(ID), otherwise it returns r =⊥.
– (sts, sto)
$← RevokeUser(ID, G,MK,PP) : Run by the data owner using its
master secret key to revoke a user’s authorisation to make queries and read
results. It does so by updating the server and data owner state.
An eVSE is correct if there is a negligible probability that verification does
not suceed when all algorithms are run honestly. A formal definition can be
found in [3].
3.3 Types of Query
We consider a broader range of verifiable queries than many prior schemes. In
particular, we consider two main types:
– Keyword matching queries: Queries of this type have formed the basis
of most prior work in SE. Suppose there exists a universe (dictionary) of
keywords. Each encrypted data item is associated with an index of one or
more keywords to describe the contents. Queries are formed over the same
universe of keywords. In this work, we permit Boolean formulae over sets
of keywords (e.g. ((a ∧ b) ∨ c) where a, b, c are keywords). We return an
identifier for each file whose associated keywords in the index satisfy this
formula. Thus we can perform very expressive search queries over keywords.
– Computational queries: Queries of this type are similar to the operations
commonly discussed in the context of outsourced computation. We allow
statistical queries over keywords (e.g. counting the number of data items
that satisfy a keyword matching query), as well as operations over selected
data values that have been encoded using additional portions of the keyword
universe. It is possible to encode the entire database in such a way as to en-
able computations over all data fields, but it would usually be more efficient
to select a (small) subset of fields that are most useful or most frequently
queried. Clearly, keyword matching queries can be seen as a special case of
computational queries where the function operator is equality testing.
– Mixed queries: Queries of this type combine both the functionalities of the
aforementioned query types (e.g. finding the average of data values contained
in all documents associated with a particular keyword).
All types of query are performed in a verifiable manner to ensure that results
are correct and complete.
3.4 Security Model
We now formalise several notions of security as a series of cryptographic games.
The adversary against each notion is modelled as a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm A run by a challenger, with input parameters chosen to
represent the knowledge of a real attacker as well as the security parameter κ.
The adversary algorithm may maintain state and be multi-stage; we refer to each
stage as A for ease of notation. The notation AO denotes the adversary being
provided with oracle access to the following algorithms: BuildIndex(·, ·,MK,PP),
AddUser(·, ·,MK,PP), Query(·, ·, ·, ·,PP) and Search(·, ·, ·, ·,PP). We assume that
oracle queries are performed in a logical order such that all required information
is generated from previous queries. For each game, we define the advantage and
security of A as:
Definition 2. The advantage of a PPT adversary A is defined as follows, where
X ∈ {PubVerif , IndPriv ,QueryPriv}:
AdvXA (eVSE , 1κ) = Pr[ExpXA [eVSE , 1κ] = 1].
Game 1 ExpPubVerifA [eVSE , 1κ]:





5: (SKID, sts)← AddUser(ID, G,MK,PP)
6: (ID? , sts, sto)← BuildIndex(δ(D?), G,MK,PP)
7: (QTQ, V KQ, RKQ)← Query(Q, sts, sto, SKID,PP)
8: R? ← AO(QTQ, V KQ, RKQ, ID? ,PP)
9: RTQ ← BVerif(R?, V KQ,PP)
10: r ← Retrieve(V KQ, RTQ, RKQ,PP)
11: if (r 6=⊥) and (r 6= Q(ID? )) then return 1
12: else return 0
An eVSE scheme is secure against Game X if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvXA(eVSE, 1κ) ≤ negl(κ) where negl is a negligible function.
Public Verifiability. In Game 1, we capture the notion of public verifiability
such that a server may not cheat by returning an incorrect result without being
detected. This is a selective notion of security where, at the beginning of the
game, the adversary chooses the challenge query and pre-index. The challenger
then initialises the system, runs AddUser for a randomly chosen ID from the
userspace, runs BuildIndex for the challenge pre-index to create the index, and
finally runs Query. The adversary is given the resulting parameters, as well as
access to the above specified oracle queries, and outputs R?, which it believes
to be an incorrect result that will, nevertheless, be accepted by the verifier.
The challenger runs the verification steps on this output. The adversary wins if
verification succeeds, yet the result is not Q(ID?).
Index Privacy and Query Privacy. In Appendix A, we provide notions of
index indistinguishability against a selective chosen keyword attack and query
privacy, which ensure that no information regarding the keywords is leaked from
the index or query tokens respectively.
4 Construction
4.1 Overview
We base our instantiation on a CP-ABE scheme. As shown by Alderman et
al. [2], CP-ABE can be used to verifiably request computations to be performed
on data held by a server, referred to as VDC. In VDC, a trusted Key Distribution
Center (KDC) initialises the system and issues a CP-ABE decryption key to the
server pertaining to the data it holds. We use a similar technique, but have the
data owner act as the KDC (so the data need not be revealed to an external
KDC, as in VDC). The index for a set of data is a CP-ABE decryption key for
a set of attributes encoding the pre-index, and is sent to the server. The method
of encoding is described in Section 4.2.
We consider the family B of Boolean functions closed under complement –
that is, if F ∈ B then F , where F (x) = F (x) ⊕ 1, is also in B. A function
F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotonic if x 6 y implies F (x) 6 F (y), where x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ y = (y1, . . . , yn) if and only if xi 6 yi for all i. For a monotonic
function F , the set AF = {x : F (x) = 1} defines a monotonic access structure.
A query Q is represented as a Boolean function of keywords and compu-
tational data points. If a monotonic CP-ABE scheme is used then queries can
be comprised of AND and OR gates (and negation can inefficiently be handled
by including both a positively and negatively labelled attribute in the universe
and requiring the presence of exactly one of them). A non-monotonic CP-ABE
scheme enables queries formed from AND, OR and NOT gates, which is a universal
set of gates, and fuzzy CP-ABE enables fuzzy keyword search. We can achieve
all functions in the class NC1, which includes common arithmetic and compar-
ison operators useful in queries. An n-bit result can be formed by performing n
Boolean queries, each of which returns the ith bit of the output.
The query token for a Boolean functionQ ∈ B comprises two CP-ABE cipher-
texts for access structures representing Q and Q ∈ B respectively. To perform
the search, the server attempts to decrypt each ciphertext under the secret key
(associated with the pre-index) and outputs the result. Each decryption succeeds
if and only if the query evaluates to True on the index. Any entity may perform
the blind verification operation using the verification key to learn only whether
the operation was performed correctly or not. Only entities holding the retrieval
token can read the value of the result.
4.2 Data Encoding
Defining the Index. Suppose the data D to be outsourced comprises n doc-
uments. We now discuss how to form a pre-index δ(D), which represents the
keywords and data fields that may be queried over.
Let D be a dictionary of keywords that describe the documents. D alone
suffices for keyword matching queries but for computational queries, we also
need to be able to encode data values such that they can be input to queries
represented as access structures encoding Boolean functions.
For each data field x that may be input to a computational query, let the
maximum size of the data value be mx bits. We define mx additional attributes
Ax,1, Ax,2, . . . , Ax,mx , and define the universe C =
⋃
x∈D ∪mxi=1Ax,i to be the
union of these attributes over all data fields. Let y be a value stored in the data
field x and let the binary representation of y be y1, . . . , ymx . We view y as a
characteristic tuple of an attribute set Ay ⊆ C, where Ay = {Ax,i : yi = 1} – we
include an attribute for position i in the set if and only if the ith bit of y is 1.
Finally, to enable the index for all n documents to be encoded within a single
CP-ABE key (and hence for computations to be performed simultaneously on
all documents), and to ensure that the correct index data is used for each query,
we must encode a labelling of the document that each attribute pertains to. We
define our attribute universe U for the CP-ABE scheme to be U = {D∪C}× [n].
Thats is, we take n copies of D and C. Each element of {D ∪ C} describes a
particular keyword or data value, and each copy relates to a different document
in D - if we index each copy of an attribute w ∈ {D ∪ C} as {wi}ni=1, then wi
denotes the presence of w in document i. In practice, it may be desirable to use a
‘large universe’ CP-ABE scheme, wherein arbitrary textual strings are mapped
to attributes (group elements), e.g. using a hash function H. Thus, for a keyword
or data value w in document i, the attribute could be defined as H(w||i).3
The pre-index of the data D is a set of attributes δ(D) ⊆ U . The index that
is outsourced will be a CP-ABE key generated over this attribute set.
Hiding the Index. In general, CP-ABE schemes do not hide the attributes
within the decryption key. This is usually expected behaviour since CP-ABE is
often used to cryptographically enforce access control policies and it is natural
to assume that an entity is aware of their access rights.
However, in this setting we are using CP-ABE not to protect objects from
unauthorised access, but instead to prove the outcome of a function evaluation.
The keys in our setting are formed over attributes encoding the index of out-
sourced data, as opposed to encoding access rights. Since the server should not
learn any information about the data, including the index, we must implement
a mechanism by which the decryption key hides the associated attributes.
In many CP-ABE schemes, the public parameters comprise an ordered set
of group elements [36], each associated with an attribute from the universe;
that is, ∀i ∈ U , choose ti $← Zp, then form the encoded attribute set {gti}i∈U .
Thus, given a key (or ciphertext) that comprises gti , it is possible, based on the
ordering of this set, to determine the attribute i ∈ U it relates to. In addition,
the attributes may be listed in the clear, and attached to keys and ciphertexts
to indicate which group elements should be applied at each point. Clearly, this
is unsuitable for our requirement for a hidden index.
To this end, we first apply a random permutation to U such that the position
of the group elements within the ordered set does not reveal the attribute string
(unless the permutation is known). We then use a symmetric encryption scheme
to encrypt each attribute x ∈ U under a key k, and then instantiate the CP-
ABE scheme on this universe of encrypted attributes. Thus, without knowledge
of the key k, the server should be unable to determine the attribute string x. We
assume that only the keywords or data items being computed over are considered
sensitive, and not the logical makeup of the Boolean function (in terms of gates).
4.3 Formal Details
The data owner initialises the system and encodes the data as an index which is
pushed to the server. Each (authorised) user will be issued with a personalised
secret key enabling them to form queries. To make a query Q, a user chooses a
random message from the message space M to act as a verification token, and
3 In this case, it may be possible to avoid the use of symmetric encryption in our
construction by letting the secret k be the key for this cryptographic hash function.
encrypt this using the CP-ABE scheme under the access structure encoding Q.
The server attempts to decrypt the ciphertext and recovers the chosen message
if and only if Q(ID) = 1. By the indistinguishability security of the CP-ABE
scheme, the server learns nothing about the message if Q(ID) = 0 since this
corresponds to an access structure not being satisfied. Thus, if a server returns
the correct message, the user is assured that the query evaluated to 1 on the
data. If, however, Q(ID) = 0, then decryption will return ⊥. This is insufficient
for verification purposes since the server can return ⊥ to convince a user of a
false negative search result. Thus, the user must, in fact, produce two CP-ABE
ciphertexts. As above, one corresponds to the function Q, whilst the other cor-
responds to Q, the complement query of Q. Hence, the server’s key will decrypt
exactly one ciphertext and the returned message will distinguish whether Q or Q
was satisfied, and therefore the value of Q(ID). A well-formed response (d0, d1)
from a server, therefore, satisfies the following:
(d0, d1) =
{
(m0,⊥), if Q(ID) = 1
(⊥,m1), if Q(ID) = 0.
(1)
Public Verifiability is achieved by publishing a token comprising a one-way func-
tion g applied to both plaintexts. Any entity can apply g to the server’s response
and compare with this token to check correctness. To achieve blind verification,
a random bit b permutes the order of the ciphertexts. Thus, verifiers that do not
know b cannot determine whether a plaintext is associated with Q or Q.
Our adversarial model allows the adversary (and hence servers in our system)
to hold more than one key (for multiple datasets); we must ensure that a key can-
not produce a valid looking response to a query on a different index. We achieve
this by labelling each pre-index with a label l(δ(D)) and define an attribute for
each label. Then, for a pre-index δ(D), the decryption key is formed over the
attribute set (δ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))). Recall that encoded data stored on the server’s
side is a collection of n documents, which we label D1, . . . , Dn. When making a
query Q(ID), a sub-query Qi may be formed for each document (e.g. to check
if a given keyword is contained in each document). In this case, the encryption
algorithm takes the access structure encoding of the conjunction (Di ∧ l(δ(D)))
for i ∈ [n]. A valid result can only be formed by applying the sub-query to the
specified document, which is also labelled by Di ∈ D – decryption succeeds if
and only if the function is satisfied and the label l(δ(D)) is matched in the key
and ciphertext. Note that a key for a different pre-index will not include the
correct label. Inputs to the Query algorithm are assumed to be in this form.
Let CPABE = (ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.Encrypt, ABE.Decrypt) de-
fine a CP-ABE encryption scheme over the universe U . Let SE= (SE.KeyGen,
SE.Encrypt, SE.Decrypt) be an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme se-
cure [7] in the sense of IND-CPA. Let BE = (BE.KeyGen, BE.Encrypt, BE.Add,
BE.Decrypt) be a broadcast encryption scheme that retains IND-CPA security
against a coalition of revoked users. Finally, let g be a one-way function and
let Π and φ be pseudo-random permutations (PRPs) (which pad their inputs if
required). Then Algorithms 1–8 define an eVSE scheme for a class of queries Q.
Alg. 1 (MK,PP)← Setup(1κ,U)
1: mk ← BE.KeyGen(1κ)
2: k ← SE.KeyGen(1κ)
3: for i ∈ U do
4: ui ← SE.Encrypt(i, k)
5: U ′ ← {ui}i∈U
6: U˜ ← Π(U ′)
7: (MSKABE,MPKABE)← ABE.Setup(1κ, U˜)
8: PP← (MPKABE, U˜)
9: MK← (MSKABE,mk, k,Π)
Alg. 2 (ID, sts, sto)← BuildIndex(δ(D), G,MK,PP)
1: ID ← ABE.KeyGen((δ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))),MSKABE,MPKABE)
2: j
$← {0, 1}κ
3: sts ← BE.Encrypt(G, j,mk)
4: sto ← j
Alg. 3 (SKID, sts)← AddUser(ID, G,MK,PP)
1: ukID ← BE.Add(ID,mk)
2: if ID is a user then SKID ← (ukID, k,Π)
3: else SKID ← ukID
4: sts ← BE.Encrypt(G ∪ ID, j,mk)
Alg. 4 (QTQ, V KQ, RKQ)← Query(Q = {Qi}, sts, sto, SKu,PP)
1: j˜ ← BE.Decrypt(sts, ukID)
2: if (j˜ 6= sto) then return ⊥
3: for i = 1 to |Q| do




6: cbi ← ABE.Encrypt(mbi , Qi,MPKABE)
7: c1−bi ← ABE.Encrypt(m1−bi , Qi,MPKABE)
8: QTQi ← (cbi , c1−bi )
9: γi ← φj(cbi‖c1−bi )
10: V KQi ← (g(m0i ), g(m1i ))
11: RKQi ← bi
12: QTQ ← {γi}, V KQ ← {V KQi}, RKQ ← {RKQi}
Alg. 5 R← Search(ID, QTQ = {γi}, sts, SKS,PP)
1: j˜ ← BE.Decrypt(sts, ukS)
2: if (j˜ 6= sts) then return ⊥
3: for i = 1 to |Q| do
4: (cbi‖c1−bi )← φ−1j˜ (γi)
5: dbi ← ABE.Decrypt(cbi , ID,MPKABE)
6: d1−bi ← ABE.Decrypt(c1−bi , ID,MPKABE)
7: Ri = (dbi , d1−bi )
8: R = {Ri}
Alg. 6 RTQ ← BVerif(R = {(di, d′i)}, V KQ = {(V Ki, V K′i)},PP)
1: for i = 1 to |Q| do
2: if V Ki = g(di) then RTQi = di
3: else if V K′i = g(d
′
i) then RTQi = d
′
i
4: else RTQi =⊥
5: RTQ = {RTQi}
Alg. 7 r ← Retrieve(V KQ = {(g(mbi), g(m1−bi))}, RTQ = {RTQi}, RKQ = {bi},PP)
1: for i = 1 to |Q| do
2: if g(RTQi ) = g(m0) then ri = 1
3: else if g(RTQi ) = g(m1) then ri = 0
4: else ri =⊥
5: r = {ri}
Alg. 8 (sts, sto)← RevokeUser(ID, G,MK,PP)
1: j′ $← {0, 1}κ
2: sts ← BE.Encrypt(G \ ID, j′,mk)
3: sto ← j′
Theorem 1. Given a selective IND-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme, an authen-
ticated symmetric encryption scheme and a broadcast encryption scheme, both
secure in the sense of IND-CPA, pseudo-random permutations Π and φ, and
a one-way function g. Let eVSE be the extended verifiable searchable encryption
scheme defined in algorithms 1–8. Then eVSE is secure in the sense of Public
Verifiability, Index Privacy and Query Privacy.
In Appendix A.1 we provide a proof sketch. Full proofs can be found in [3].
In Appendix B we discuss the trade-off between efficiency and functionality of
our scheme. Note that we can add additional contextual access control following
Alderman et al. [1] by replacing φ with a key assignment scheme.
5 Conclusion
With this work we have begun to consider the application of VC techniques in the
setting of searchable encryption. On the searchable encryption side, this enables
additional functionality in the form of computational queries (e.g. computing the
average of outsourced data fields that are linked to a specific set of keywords),
whilst on the VC side, this introduces additional privacy concerns regarding the
outsourced data and computations. The choice of using VC techniques based on
ABE stems from the natural correspondence between attributes and keywords in
an index. However, future work should investigate other forms of VC to achieve
different classes of functionality and (especially) improve efficiency.
In future work, we would like to consider a model whereby multiple data own-
ers can store data on a server without each having to initialise their own scheme.
In practice, this could result in the Key Distribution Center from VDC [2] set-
ting up the system and publishing public parameters that any data owner can
use, but enabling each data owner to generate their own CP-ABE decryption
keys for the data they hold.
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A Security Models
Index Privacy. In Game 2, we formalise the notion of index indistinguisha-
bility against a selective chosen keyword attack, which ensures no information
regarding the keywords is leaked from the index. Firstly the adversary outputs
two sets of attributes (D0, D1 ⊆ U) that they wish to be challenged on, with
the restriction that |D0| = |D1| (this is required as the CP-ABE used to pro-
duce the index does not conceal the index length). The challenger runs Setup to
produce the public and secret parameters. The challenger selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random to select which set of attributes to encode into the index.
Before the index is created, the challenger needs to create the pre-index from
the set of attributes Db (line 4 of Game 2). This is done using an Encode mech-
anism that takes the elements of Db as input and outputs the pre-index δ(Db).
Encode is not required in our instantiation as the pre-indexes can be chosen di-
rectly from U˜ as the user knows the mapping from U to U ′ and the permutation
Π; the adversary however does not. The challenger then runs BuildIndex using
δ(Db) to produce the index IDb , which is given to A. The adversary is then
given PP and oracle access, with the restriction that the query results are iden-
tical for each index ID0 , ID1 , i.e. if R0 ← Search(ID0 , QTQ, sts, SKS,PP) and
R1 ← Search(ID1 , QTQ, sts, SKS,PP) then we need R0 = R1. After this query
Game 2 ExpIndPrivA [eVSE , 1κ]:
1: (D0, D1, Q)← A(1κ,U)







7: (SKID, sts)← AddUser(ID, G,MK,PP)
8: δ(Db)← Encode(Db)
9: (IDb , sts, sto)← BuildIndex(δ(Db), G,MK,PP)
10: b′ ← AO(IDb , sts,PP)
11: return (b′ == b)
Game 3 ExpQueryPrivA [eVSE , 1κ]:
1: (Q0, Q1)← A(1κ,U)







7: (SKID, sts)← AddUser(ID, G,MK,PP)
8: δ(Db)
$← U˜
9: (ID, sts, sto)← BuildIndex(δ(D), G,MK,PP)
10: Q˜b ← Encode(Qb)
11: (QTQb , V KQb , RKQb )← Query(Q˜b, sts, sto, SKID,PP)
12: b′ ← AO(QTQb , V KQb , RKQb , ID, sts,PP)
13: return (b′ == b)
phase, A outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if the comparison operator ==
returns 1 which indicates that b′ = b. Hence A wins the game if they can identify
which attribute set (D0 or D1) was encoded into the index IDb .
Query Privacy. The queries themselves should not leak any information about
the corresponding keywords that make up the query. Our construction of the
queries leaks the gates, but not the keywords themselves. This notion of query in-
distinguishability against a selective chosen query attack is formalised in Game 3.
The game runs similarly to that of Game 2, subject to the following restrictions:
the challenge queries (Q0, Q1) must use the same gates. We denote the gate
structure of a query Q by GQ, and hence require that GQ0 = GQ1 .
A.1 Security Proofs
Proof (Public Verifiability). Here we provide a proof sketch; full details can
be found in [3]. We start by assuming that AeV SE is an adversary with non-
negligible advantage δ. We begin by defining the following three games:
– Game A. This is the selective Public Verifiability game as defined in Game 1.
– Game B. This is the same as Game A with the modification that in Query,
we no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1.
Instead, we choose another random message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if Q(ID) = 1,
we replace c1 by ABE.Encrypt(Q,m
′,MPKABE). Otherwise, we replace c0 by
ABE.Encrypt(Q,m′,MPKABE).
– Game C. This is the same as Game B with the exception that instead
of choosing a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge
input w in the one-way function game.
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective
Public Verifiability game can be used to construct an adversary that may invert
the one-way function g.
We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing advantage be-
tween Game A and Game B. We construct an adversary AABE that creates an
eVSE instance by executing algorithms 1–8 and uses AeV SE as a sub-routine to
break the selective IND-CPA security of the CP-ABE scheme. The advantage
of our constructed adversary is AdvAABE > δ2 . Hence, if AeV SE has advantage
δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the sIND-CPA game for
CP-ABE with non-negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the CP-ABE
scheme to be secure, we conclude that AeV SE cannot distinguish the games with
non-negligible probability. The transition from Game B to Game C is simply
to set the value of m′i to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the
challenge w in the one-way function inversion game. We argue that the adver-
sary has no distinguishing advantage between these games since the new value
is independent of anything else in the system bar the verification key g(w) and
hence looks random to an adversary with no additional information. Finally we
show that using AeV SE in Game C, AABE can invert the one-way function g –
that is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. Now, if AeV SE is successful,
it will output a forgery comprising the plaintext encrypted under the unsatis-
fied query (Q or Q). By construction, this will be w and AABE can therefore
forward this result to C in order to invert the one-way function with the same
non-negligible probability that AeV SE has against the public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is sIND-CPA secure and the one-way
function is hard-to-invert, then eVSE as defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in
the sense of selective Public Verifiability. uunionsq
The remaining proofs can be found in the full version [3].
B Discussion
Our scheme extends the expressiveness of queries that can be achieved in VSE.
No other VSE schemes to our knowledge are able to perform the range of search
queries or include negation of keywords in their search queries. Additionally our
scheme leaks neither the access or the search pattern to the server whilst exe-
cuting a search. Our combination of search queries with computational queries
is also a novel functionality in the field of VSE.
The search time and size of the queries are both linear in n (the amount
of data items stored on the remote server). Due to this eVSE may be more
suited to smaller databases to prevent these features from being prohibitively
expensive. The VSE scheme of [13] has a search time that is linear in the number
Table 1: Comparison of Schemes
Scheme Data type Query type Publicly
Verifiable
Leakage Computations
[33] Static Ranked equality No AP,SP No
[22] Dynamic Equality Yes AP No
[30] Static Conjunctive, Disjunctive No AP No
[31] Dynamic Conjunctive No AP No
[29] Dynamic Equality No AP, SP No
[37] Static Equality No AP No
[34] Static Fuzzy No AP, SP No
[16] Static Semantic No AP, SP No




Static Arbitrary CNF/DNF Yes None Yes
formulae, NC1
of letters in the queried keyword (which is usually much smaller than n). This
faster search is achieved using a tree-based index, however only a single keyword
equality search can be performed. Another scheme built using ABE [37] is able
to achieve multi-level access, where users can be restricted to searching only
certain parts of the database. Keywords are grouped with respect to their access
control policies, and the search time is linear in the number of groups. This
scheme also only achieves a single keyword equality search. The scheme of [35]
achieves verifiable fuzzy keyword search with a search time that is linear in the
size of the fuzzy keyword set (which varies depending on the level of fuzziness
required i.e. searching for data items that contain keywords of edit distance two
will require a larger fuzzy keyword set than searching for keywords with an edit
distance of one from the queried keyword [23]). Again, this is likely to be less
than n. In terms of the number of rounds of communication required per search,
our scheme is optimal requiring only one round of communication. The size of
the search results in our scheme is also linear in n. Most VSE schemes in the
literature return results of a size that is linear in the number of data items that
match the query, however this method leaks the access pattern which in turn
may leak information about the query. Our scheme hides the access pattern as
all search results are of the same form, regardless of what query was submitted.
In terms of security, as illustrated in our security games, our scheme achieves
public verifiability, index privacy and query privacy (in terms of the keywords
searched for), which is comparable to other VSE schemes that have been dis-
cussed. Overall, our scheme sacrifices efficiency when compared to existing VSE
schemes, but gains much increased functionality and query expressiveness.
Table 1 gives a comparison between our scheme and those in the literature.
